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LABOR LAW-OBJECTS OF UNION ACTION-ORGANIZATION OF MANAGERS 
OF RETAIL CHAIN SroREs AS PROPER OBJECT-The owner and operator of 
retail food stores located throughout the nation brought action to enjoin strike 
· activities by the defendant union, which sought recognition as bargaining agent 
for managers and clerks in the local stores. Both clerks and store managers had 
been members of the defendant local unions since 1937, and the latter, acting 
under certification as bargaining representative for both groups of employees 
under the National Labor Relations Act, had negotiated contracts with the plain-
tiff covering managers and clerks continuously since that time. Upon the 
refusal of the plaintiff to include the store managers in the contract, or to 
recognize the clerks' unions as the representatives of the store managers, the 
union struck and the present action was commenced. Held, with a dissenting 
opinion, that the union activities in seeking recognition as bargaining agent 
for local retail store managers, who were supervisory employees, were not 
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reasonably related to any legitimate interest of organized labor, were not in 
furtherance of any proper labor objective, and, as a matter of sound public 
policy, were enjoinable within equity jurisdiction of the court. Safeway Stores, 
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Internatianal Assn., 41 Cal. (2d) 567, 261 P. (2d) 721 
(1953) 
It is well settled that the objects of peaceful concerted activity by unions 
must be proper1 and that the propriety of those objectives may be determined 
by the state as a matter of public policy so long as the decision is not arbitrary, 
discriminatory, or in conflict with an applicable federal statute. 2 Since super-
visors have been excluded from the benefits of the National Labor Relations 
Act, 3 the representation by a single union of both managers and the employees 
they supervise would seem to be a proper question of public policy for the state. 
In the principal case, however, the conflict within the court was caused by the 
majority's apparent disregard of a state statute which, according to the dissenting 
opinion, declared the policy of the state in providing that all employees have 
the right to self-organization in unions of their own choosing, to negotiate the 
terms and conditions of their employment, and to engage in concerted activities 
for their mutual benefit and protection.4 The question of whether a super-
visor is an employee under such a statute, and the determination of an appro-
priate bargaining unit for him, have posed problems of increasing complexity 
for labor boards, both federal and state. The NLRB, after some hesitancy in 
policy, held that supervisors were employees under the original federal act.6 
But except in particular industries where joint collective bargaining by super-
visors and workers was traditional, 6 or in instances where a supervisor was 
one in name only,7 the NLRB was reluctant to declare appropriate a bargain-
ing unit composed of both supervisors and the men they supervise.8 A similar 
result is found in states having comprehensive labor legislation, none of the 
boards denying that a supervisor is an employee under the acts9 unless specifically 
1 Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Alliance and Bartenders International 
League of America v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265, 30 S. (2d) 696 (1947). 4 ToRTS RE-
STATEMENT §§783, 784 (1939). 
2 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 70 S.Ct. 773 
(1950); Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 70 S.Ct. 784 (1950). 
3 61 Stat. L. 138, 151 (1947), 2 U.S.C. (1952) §§142, 164. 
41 Cal. Labor Code (Deering, 1953) §923. 
5 Hearst Publications, Inc., 25 N.L.R.B. 621 (1940); Boeing Airplane Co., 46 
N.L.R.B. 267 (1942). SMITH, Ll.BOR LAw, 2d ed., pp. 66-68 (1953). But see also Great 
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 463 (1946). 
6 The printing trades: Chicago Rotoprint Co., 45 NL.R.B. 1263 (1942); the maritime 
industry: Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 102 (1936). For other trades and indl.19-
tries in which joint collective bargaining by supervisors and workers has been recognized 
by the NLRB, see "Union Membership and Collective Bargaining by Foremen," U.S. 
Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bul. 745 (1943). 
7 Shell Petroleum Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 831 (1938). 
8 Numerous cases illustrating this policy may be found in NLRB TBIRD ANmrAL 
Rm>on'l' 180 (1938); NLRB FIFTH ANmrAL REPORT 70 (1940). 
9 Third Avenue Transit Corp., 16 Lab. Rel. Rep. 694 (1945); Sears, Roebuck and 
Co., 8 L.R.R.M. 393 (1941). See also New York State Labor Relations Board v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 52 N.Y.S. (2d) 590 (1944). 
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excluded by them, 10 and all of the boards agreeing that supervisors and their 
employees as a matter of policy should not generally be placed in the same 
bargaining unit.11 Thus the majority in the principal case comes to a con-
clusion not unlike the decisions of labor boards in other jurisdictions. But 
while in other states authority is vested in a proper agency to determine the 
appropriate bargaining unit, no such authority is specifically granted to the 
courts of California. Consequently the question may involve the propriety of 
a state court's disregard for the unqualified assertion of the legislature that 
employees may freely choose their own bargaining representative.12 In the 
final analysis the basic policy decision should take into account two factors: 
the history of collective bargaining in the particular unit, 13 and the degree of 
proximity of the functions of the supervisors in question to those of either 
real policy-making management or to the rank and file employee.14 In most 
situations, the grouping of supervisors with the workers they supervise will add 
immeasurably to an already complicated labor relations picture, and thus on 
purely pragmatic grounds15- should be discouraged wherever found in its initial 
stages.16 But such a policy must be administered with discretion, for, as in 
the principal case, it is difficult to believe that social benefit will be derived from 
the destruction of a bargaining relationship with a twelve year history of 
presumably successful negotiations and contracts.17 
John F. Dodge,. Jr., S.Ed. 
10 In Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Colorado, supervisors are specifically excluded from 
the coverage of the labor relations acts. 
11 Bee Line, Inc., 6 N.Y.S.L.R.B. 686 (1943); Loew's Boston Theatres Co., 2 L.R.R. 
M. 557 (1938). See also PENNSYLVANIA LAlloR RELATIONS BoARD, F1FTH ANmrAL RE-
PORT 50 (1941); NEw Yonx: STATE LABOR RELATIONS BoARD, SIXTH ANmrAL REPORT 
53 (1942). 
12 As the dissenting opinion points out, the right to choose the bargaining representa-
tive is unqualifiedly reserved to the workers by the California statute, note 4 supra. And 
there is no mention in the statute of the appropriate bargaining unit, or who is to make the 
decision concerning it. Since the problem of the appropriate unit has been judicially rele-
vant only since the passage of the NLRA and the subsequent Little Wagner Acts, and 
has been limited to questions of certification under those acts, its judicial use in the context 
of the principal case may be questioned. 
13 See note 6 supra. 
14 Another factor of minor importance is the feasibility of finding some unit which 
is appropriate, when a proposed unit is denied to supervisors desiring to unionize. For 
without a doubt foremen have a right to join a union of some type. Packard Motor Co. v. 
NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 67 S.Ct. 789 (1947), and 61 Stat. L. 151 (1947), 2 U.S.C. 
(1952) §164. 
15 Unfortunately many of the arguments posed on both sides of the question have been 
purely ideological, thus furnishing little practical aid in solving an important problem of 
industrial relations. 
16 See an excellent discussion of the whole subject in LmTER, THE FoRE:MAN IN 
ImmsTRIAL RELATIONS 126-165 (1948). Also KILLINGSWORTH, STATE LAlloR RELATIONS 
Aro:s 198-203 (1948). 
17 By merely enjoining the picketing by the defendant union on the ground that there 
had been violence, many of the problems of the principal case could have been avoided. 
In addition, an argument on the conflicting policy toward supervisors represented on the 
one hand by the Taft-Hartley Act and on the other by the California statute could have 
proved interesting. But such an argument was absent in the principal case and is largely 
outside of the scope of this note. 
